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Abstract
This paper studies whether firms learn from major supply-chain disruptions and adjust their pro-
duction network to create immunity to future similar shocks. I use a ten-year time period com-
prehending two events that caused major production network disruptions - The Great East Japan
Earthquake, in March 2011, and the COVID-19 global pandemic, in 2020. I first show that compa-
nies with Japanese suppliers during the Japanese earthquake diversified their production network in
the years following the disaster. I then document that this learning mechanism provided immunity
to the downstream propagation of the COVID-19 shock.
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1 Introduction
The global integration of modern economies, despite all the benefits conveyed by the vast number of
people, capitals and trade flows across countries, constantly exposes companies to the risk of being
negatively affected by shocks impacting their business partners (Menzly and Ozbas (2010), Boone
and Ivanov (2012), Kelly et al. (2013)). As stated in Carvalho (2014), “A modern economy is an
intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on the flow of inputs from their
suppliers to produce their own output, which in turn is routed towards other downstream units”. The
global integration of firms’ supply-chains and consequent high dependence on inputs produced in
other parts of the globe is an important driver of the cross-country propagation of the negative
consequences of such idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, one of the well-documented propaga-
tion mechanisms is the firm-level downstream propagation of shocks along the supply-chain, i.e.,
negative shocks disrupting firms’ production networks are transmitted to the firm, impacting nega-
tively its performance (Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), Carvalho et al. (2016), Boehm et al. (2019),
Pankratz and Schiller (2019)). Given the empirically documented firms’ vulnerability to supply-
chain disruptions, studying how firms can optimally react to this type of shocks and possibly hedge
against future similar incidents is of major importance.
In this paper, I study whether firms learn from being exposed to major incidents in their supply-
chain networks and adjust their production network in order to mitigate the negative effect of future
identical events. In order to answer this question, I use The Great East Japan Earthquake, in March
2011, as a natural experiment to identify companies that suffered a severe disruption in their pro-
duction network. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that companies with Japanese
suppliers at the time of the earthquake (treatment group) diversified more their supply-chain net-
work after this shock, when compared to companies without trade-relationships with Japanese firms
in that period (control group). This adjustment mechanism occurred in two dimensions: on aver-
age, these companies increased not only the total number of suppliers but also the geographical
dispersion of their production network, by expanding their trade-relationships to new countries. As
of 2014, a firm belonging to the treatment group had, on average, 8.6 suppliers and 1.8 supplier
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countries more than a similar firm in the control group.
In order to understand if this adjustment mechanism is an optimal response to supply-chain
shocks, I observe the market reaction to the downstream propagation effect of a posterior supply-
chain disruption event. In specific, I use the COVID-19 global pandemic as a laboratory to study
this hypothesis. I start by showing that COVID-19 brought severe consequences for companies at
a worldwide scale, both directly and through the downstream propagation of the shock. This part
of the paper is grounded on the recent work of Ding et al. (2020).1 I extract country-level data on
the number of COVID-19 reported infections for the first quarter of 2020, and build the variable
COVID-19, defined as the weekly growth rate of cumulative COVID-19 cases in each country. I
also compute firms’ weekly stock market returns for the same time-period using dividend-adjusted
closing stock prices. Moreover, in order to study the propagation of the shock via supplier-customer
linkages, I obtain data on pre-pandemic business relationships among firms from FactSet Revere.
Finally, several firm and economy characteristics are also considered. I document that an econ-
omy’s exposure to the COVID-19 (measured by the variable COVID-19) impacts negatively and
strongly the stock market performance of firms operating in that economy. I add to this paper by
also examining the impact of the pandemic on several corporate fundamentals. I find that Net Sales
decreased, on average, by more than 1% in each of the first two quarters of 2020, while ROA and
CAPEX/Assets fell, on average, 0.85 and 0.32 percentage points per quarter in the first half of the
year, respectively. Firms’ indebtedness level increased during the pandemic period.
With respect to the propagation effect, this paper provides evidence supporting this phenomenon.
I construct the variable Suppliers’ Exposure, as the weighted average of COVID-19 among the sup-
plier countries, where the weights are given by the pre-pandemic number of suppliers from each
country. Using the Suppliers’ Exposure as a proxy for the severity of the supply-chain disruption,
I isolate the impact of this variable on firms’ weekly stock returns. Either considering only the
market reaction in the first quarter of 2020 (as in Ding et al. (2020)) or extending the sample-period
1In this study, the authors start by evaluating the adverse effects of a firm’s direct exposure to the COVID-19 virus
on firms’ stock market returns and, afterwards, test if several characteristics can affect firms’ reaction to this unexpected
event. In particular, they focus on firms’ production networks to test the downstream propagation of the shock along
the supply-chain.
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until the end of August, the result is consistent: a higher exposure to the COVID-19 crisis in the
network of suppliers (higher value of Suppliers’ Exposure) impacts negatively firm’s stock price. A
one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 0.22 and 0.13 percentage points
drop in firms’ weekly stock returns, respectively, for the two time-periods in analysis.
I then show that the impact of the downstream propagation of the COVID-19 crisis is less severe
for firms previously affected by The Great East Japan Earthquake. This evidence strongly suggests
that the production network’s adjustment process undertaken by these firms in the years following
the earthquake generated immunity to future similar supply-chain shocks.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. Firstly, the results of this paper contribute
to a vast body of research that looks at firms’ vulnerability to supply-chain shocks. Previous empiri-
cal evidence uncovers the existence of downstream propagation of shocks affecting firms’ suppliers.
Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) use data on natural disasters in the US since 1978 (this includes bliz-
zards, earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes) combined with information on headquarters’ locations
and corporate performance indicators to show that 1) natural disasters have a considerable short-
run impact on the annual sales growth of firms situated in affected areas; 2) firms with at least one
affected supplier experience an average 2-3 percentage points decrease in annual sales growth and
the impact is more pronounced in the case of hard-to-substitute inputs; 3) there is horizontal prop-
agation of the negative impact for the companies’ other non-affected suppliers. Using hurricanes
data, Seetharam (2018) studies the spatial propagation of the impact of the disasters by examining
linkages between disrupted and non-disrupted regions through plant ties within firms. Boehm et al.
(2019) rely on the supply-chain disruption caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake from 2011
in order to evaluate cross-country propagation of shocks. Their work focus on the US affiliates
of Japanese multinational companies and their main finding suggests that in the aftermath of the
shock, the output produced by these firms dropped sizably, along with a decline in imports. Besides
documenting the up and downstream propagation of the disruption caused by the earthquake, Car-
valho et al. (2016) also estimate the overall macroeconomic impact of the catastrophe considering
the propagation effects. Alternatively, Todo et al. (2014) also use this natural experiment to exploit
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firms’ resilience to supply-chain disruptions. They document that firms with broader and more
diversified production networks are more exposed to this idiosyncratic risk, delaying the recovery
after the shock. Nonetheless, this negative effect is offset by the benefit conveyed by a diversified
network of suppliers and customers, which allows for an accelerated replacement process of the
harmed trade partners. Pankratz and Schiller (2019) draw similar conclusions regarding the role
of the production networks in the propagation of shocks, in this case using extreme heatwaves and
flooding incidents. Their study documents both direct and indirect large negative effects of these
events in the revenues of the suppliers, as well as of their customers, through vertical propagation
of the shock. This paper adds to this stream of literature by analyzing also the adaptation process
that the customer firms decide to undertake in the aftermath of the shock. Accordingly, they find
that these firms tend to diversify their production network towards lower climate risk suppliers.
This literature on the propagation effect innovates in relation to a vast stream of previous work
focusing on how idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks are transmitted through industry linkages
(Long and Plosser (1987), Horvath (1998), di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010), Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Carvalho (2014)). The current availability of supplier-customer relationships data at the
firm-level allows researchers to explore the propagation and amplification of idiosyncratic shocks
at a more granular level, as it is performed in this study. Moreover, this study also documents new
insights on the capacity that firms have to adjust their behavior after being negatively affected by
shocks (learning mechanism) (Malerba (1992), Hayward (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), Hu
and Hassink (2017), Pankratz and Schiller (2019)).
Additionally, this study is also intimately related to the recent work of many researchers on
studying the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this regard, Baker et al. (2020) defend that gov-
ernment restrictions on commercial activity impacted much more strongly the US stock markets in
the case of COVID-19 when compared to previous pandemics due to increasingly service-oriented
nature of this economy. In a different perspective, using the timeline of the geographical propaga-
tion of the virus, Ramelli and Wagner (2020) show that the anticipation of the real effects brought
by the health crisis were amplified through financial channels. Additionally, other researchers fo-
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cused on how expectations changed during the pandemic (Giglio et al. (2020), Bartik et al. (2020)).
In summary, this paper brings new insights on the immunity that firms exposed to a supply-
chain disruption in the past exhibit when facing a similar shock. Besides, the adjustment process
that firms undertake after being negatively impacted by a supply-chain shock and that allows them
to build such immunity is also one of the main contributions of this paper. Furthermore, this paper
also explores new dynamics driven by production network shocks, by extending the time period
of the analysis until the end of August 2020, comprehending the markets recovery period after the
first global wave of COVID-19 cases. This extension provides the necessary framework to assess if
firms with a higher exposure to COVID-19 in their production network experience a more difficult
recovery when compared to similar less supplier-exposed firms. Finally, this paper adds to the
literature by complementing the existing insights on the impact of the pandemic, both on stock
market returns and on several corporate fundamentals (real effects).
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the data and methodology. Section
3 is focused on The Great East Japan Earthquake. In section 4, I document the production network
diversification followed by affected firms in the aftermath of this event . In section 5, I quantify
the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and document its downstream propagation effect.
In section 6, I test the immunity to production network shocks. Finally, in section 7, I provide the
concluding remarks of the paper. All relevant tables and figures can be found at the end of the
paper.
2 Data and methodology
In this paper, I examine whether firms learn from major supply-chain disruptions and adjust their
production network to create immunity to future similar shocks. In order to address this hypothesis,
I focus on two events that occurred almost a decade apart. In the first place, I use The Great East
Japan Earthquake, in March 2011, as an exogenous event that caused a major disruption in the pro-
duction network of firms with suppliers affected by this disaster (Todo et al. (2014), Carvalho et al.
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(2016), Boehm et al. (2019)). I study whether these companies adjusted their production network
in the aftermath of the shock, in particular by diversifying their production network. In order to test
if this adjustment mitigates the negative consequences of future similar shocks (immunity effect),
I focus on the impact of the downstream propagation triggered by a posterior disruptive event. In
this regard, I look at a major global crisis that caused severe disruptions in companies’ supply-chain
networks: the COVID-19 global pandemic.
I construct the sample in a forward-looking fashion as I need to observe how companies are
affected in these two events (via supplier-customer relationships) and also the production networks
adjustment process between them, if any. Moreover, for comparability purposes, I select a sample
of firms following the recent literature on the negative effects of the COVID-19 crisis. In specific,
I follow Ding et al. (2020).2 Accordingly, the sample is composed by listed companies that are
present in three distinct databases: 1) Thomson Reuters WORLDSCOPE, from which it is possible
to retrieve corporate financial data; 2) Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG, that contains information
on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance; 3) FactSet Revere, with data on supply-
chain relationships.3 Furthermore, stocks that were not actively traded in 2020 were excluded from
the sample. As such, I end up with a sample of 3551 firms from 52 different countries.4 Table A1
(in the appendix) displays the distribution of firms per country in the sample.
2.1 Production network diversification
In order to understand if affected firms (via downstream propagation of the shock) diversified their
production network after The Great East Japan Earthquake (March 2011), I use a difference-in
differences approach comparing the diversification level of two groups of firms: firms with Japanese
2This paper follows the first version of Ding et al. (2020) that can be found here: https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3586187
3Ding et al. (2020) use the data available in the ASSET4 ESG database to show that firms with higher pre-pandemic
CSR performance are less affected by the exposure to the COVID-19, suggesting that CSR activities induce stakehold-
ers to take decisions that support the firm in response to a negative shock.
4The difference in the number of observations between this paper and Ding et al. (2020) is, most likely, the result
of a different merging process with the supply-chain relationships dataset. The merging process followed by Ding et al.
(2020) is not detailed in the paper. Hence, I was not able to reproduce the same steps in order to achieve the same final
sample of firms.
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suppliers in March 2011 (the treatment group) and firms without suppliers in this country at that
time (the control group). I extract data on firms’ trade relationships from FactSet Revere, for
the years between 2008 and 2014. The decision to focus on this time-period relies on two main
aspects: 1) by considering a relatively large time-period before the shock, it is possible to test the
parallel trend assumption required for the correct identification under a difference-in-differences
approach; 2) the post-earthquake period considered should not be too wide, as it increases the risk
of confounding factors, but also not too short, as creating new supplier relationships may take years.
To measure diversification, I use two different outcome variables: the Total Number of Suppliers
and the Number of Supplier Countries at the end of each year, between 2008 and 2014. I am able
to retrieve relationships’ information for the complete period 2008-2014 for a subsample of 940
firms, from which 123 had suppliers in Japan in March 2011.
Furthermore, in this difference-in-differences setting, I also control for the Share of Differen-
tiated Inputs of the firm in each year. Since Japanese industries are amongst the most advanced
and innovative worldwide, producing technologically advanced products, a firm’s necessity for
differentiated inputs may be related to the existence of suppliers in Japan in March 2011 and, si-
multaneously, impacts the ability of firms to diversify its network of suppliers.5 This variable is
built according to the classification of goods traded in international markets based on Rauch (1999)
and used by other authors (e.g., Giannetti et al. (2011) and Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016)). This list
categorizes the inputs traded according to the sector (SIC 2-digit code) in which the good is pro-
duced. I then compute, for each year, the share of each firm’s suppliers that belong to the industries
classified as producing differentiated inputs.
2.2 The COVID-19 pandemic: direct impact and propagation effect
In the second part of this paper, I focus on the COVID-19 global pandemic and its implications.
Following the approach in Ding et al. (2020), I analyze the impact of the COVID-19 global pan-
demic (both the direct impact and the propagation effect along the supply-chain) on stock market
5Source: https://www.eubusinessinjapan.eu/sectors
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returns, while controlling for several firm and economic characteristics. Firstly, I focus on the same
time period as the authors (between January and March 2020). I collect data on COVID-19 in-
fections from the Coronavirus Resource Center managed by the Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (CSSE) at the Johns Hopkins University (JHU).6 This platform contains a compre-
hensive dynamic dashboard that compiles country-level daily information, starting on the 22nd of
January 2020, on COVID-19 reported cases, tracing, testing and vaccination efforts, at a global
level. I compute the weekly growth rate of cumulative confirmed infections to measure the propa-
gation of COVID-19 in a given country:
COVID-19c,t = ln(1+Confirmed Infectionsc,t)− ln(1+Confirmed Infectionsc,t−1) (1)
Where c and t denote, respectively, country and week.7
In what concerns firms’ stock market returns, I extract firms’ dividend-adjusted closing stock
price data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. I then compute the percentage weekly stock return
using the closing price at the last trading day of the week (Friday).8
In order to measure firms’ suppliers’ exposure to COVID-19, i.e., the different levels of expo-
sure that firms face in their production network, the variable Suppliers’ Exposure is built combining
two sources of data. First, I obtain data on the companies’ pre-pandemic supply-chain relationships
(as of December 2019) from FactSet Revere.9 This database aggregates information from corpo-
rate reports, annual fillings, press releases and investor presentations to build a global map of the
business relationships among companies. One of the key features of this database is that it covers
both direct and reverse disclosed relationships, i.e, connections disclosed by the reporting company
(direct disclosure) and connections disclosed by firms doing business with the reporting company
(reverse disclosure). As a result of this data collection approach, FactSet Revere comprises a vast
6See https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
7This variable is built using the cumulative number of confirmed cases at the last working day of the week, encom-
passing the variation of confirmed cases from Saturday to Friday in week t, in country c.
8I compute the weekly stock returns using the last trading day of each week to match the weekly growth rate of
cumulative COVID-19 cases.
9Available in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) platform.
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number of interconnections between firms (more than 250.000 reported relationships in 2019),
providing a broad and reliable data source of supply-chain relationships. In addition, this database
also contains information regarding the industry (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes)
in which firms operate. I then combine data on pre-pandemic supply-chain relationships with the
cumulative COVID-19 cases database to build a measure of each firm’s suppliers’ exposure to the








Where i, c and t are, respectively, firm, supplier country and week indexes. Besides, ni is
firm i’s total number of suppliers and ni,c refers to the number of suppliers of firm i located in
country c. Analogously, Suppliers’ Exposurei,t is the weighted average of COVID-19 among the
supplier countries, where the weights are given by the pre-pandemic number of suppliers from each
country and COVID-19 varies weekly. This variable is then merged with the main dataset using a
combination of three company identifiers (FactSet ID, Company ID from Revere and International
Securities Identification Number - ISIN).
Regarding the control variables, I obtain corporate financial data from the Thomson Reuters
WORLDSCOPE database. In particular: Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the book
value of total assets; Leverage, as the percentage of total debt over total assets; Cash, expressed
as cash and equivalents divided by total assets; finally, Return on Assets, which corresponds to
the ratio of net income over total assets. I use annual financial data from 2018, as in Ding et al.
(2020).10 As for country characteristics, I retrieve data from the World Development Indicators
database (the World Bank’s main cross-country source of development data) also for the year of
2018. The first set of variables relates to the economic performance of the country, comprising
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and its evolution, captured by the growth rate of GDP.
Besides, the percentage of the population aged above 65 years old is also added to the analysis
10The authors use data of 2018 as it was the most recent year of available data.
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since a COVID-19 infection poses higher risk to the older generation. It is important to control for
the share of population in this age range, since it may influence the promptness and severity of the
governments’ decisions to contain the spread of the virus. Lastly, as in Ding et al. (2020), a set of
dummy variables for the legal origin of the economies is also included: English, French, German
or Scandinavian origin. Legal origin’s data is compiled in La Porta et al. (2008).
As previously mentioned, adding to the paper of Ding et al. (2020), I also explore the impact
of COVID-19 on several firm’s financial and performance indicators (real effects). To accomplish
this, I extract firm’s quarterly data from the Thomson Reuters WORLDSCOPE database, for the
time-period comprehended between the first quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020. It is
important to mention that I am only able to explore this hypothesis for a subsample of firms, since
the number of firms with disclosed financial information for the first two quarters of 2020 is fairly
low when compared to the full sample. As outcome variables, I use Log (Net Sales), Debt/Assets,
Return on Assets and CAPEX/Assets. The set of firm-level controls included in the analysis com-
prises Log(Total Assets), Cash/Assets, Market-to-Book Ratio and Working Capital/Assets.
2.3 Immunity to production network shocks
In the final part of this paper, I study if the supply-chain diversification undertaken by firms previ-
ously affected by the downstream propagation of the shock triggered by the Japanese earthquake
created immunity to the downstream effect of the COVID-19 disruption. I retrieve data on firms’
relationships for the year of 2011 from FactSet Revere. I make use of two different variables:
Dummy Japanese Suppliers 2011, that takes the value of 1 if a firm had Japanese suppliers in
March 2011 and 0 otherwise (extensive margin); and Number of Japanese Suppliers 2011 which
represents the number of Japanese suppliers of a firm in March 2011 (intensive margin). I end up
with a subsample of 1987 firms, from which 171 had suppliers in Japan in March 2011.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.11 Panel B also reports summary statis-
11In the appendix: table A2 provides a detailed description of all the mentioned variables.
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tics for Weekly Stock Return, COVID-19 and Suppliers’ Exposure for the extended time-period
(January-August 2020). The average number of suppliers and supplier countries in the 2008-2014
period is 14,94 and 4.01, respectively. Moreover, in the first quarter of 2020, the sample average
weekly stock market return was -2.37%, while the median was around -1%. This decline is also
observed in figure A1 of the appendix, particularly in the period between the end of February and
mid-March. Afterwards, the stock returns initiate an upward trend. This behavior is in line with
the overall behavior registered in several stock indexes (see appendix, figure A2). On average,
COVID-19 infections increase by almost 60% each week in the first quarter of 2020, in the coun-
tries represented in the sample (the average of COVID-19 is 0.59). Finally, Suppliers’ Exposure has
an average of 0.72 and a standard deviation of 0.79, indicating large disparities in firm’s exposure
to COVID-19 through their supply-chain network.
3 The Great East Japan Earthquake
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit the Pacific Ocean, with its epicenter only
77km off the east cost of the Japanese region of Tōhoku. This catastrophe, entitled by the Japanese
Government as The Great East Japan Earthquake, was the most devastating earthquake ever regis-
tered in Japan and it is placed fourth in the list of most powerful earthquakes since 1900 (Boehm
et al., 2019).12 Besides, the main tremor generated a massive tsunami that reached the eastern
coast of Honshu (the largest Japanese island) a few minutes after the quake, flooding more than
500 square kilometers of land, inundating entire towns and villages (Ishiwatari, 2014). The impact
of the tsunami brought tremendous losses and destruction to several Japanese coastal areas. The
geographical distribution of the impact of the earthquake can be found in figure A3 of the appendix.
Moreover, this catastrophe also triggered a nuclear crisis. The 11 nuclear power plants in the north-
east Japan stopped working as several damages were reported. The most well-known case is the
accident in the Fukushima nuclear reactor, that rapidly became a level 7 nuclear event (the highest
12The first three positions of this ranking are occupied, respectively, by the Valdivia Earthquake (Chile, 1960), the
1964 Great Alaska Earthquake and the Sumatra-Andaman Islands Earthquake, in 2004. Source: US Geological Survey.
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level in the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)), as the radiation near the
reactor started increasing (Norio et al., 2012). These nuclear accidents led to considerable power
outages that were persistent for months and undermined the recovery of the economic activity in
the affected areas (Boehm et al., 2019). Overall, the Japan’s Cabinet Office estimated the impact of
the earthquake and its aftermaths with a direct economic cost of 16.9 trillion yens, or equivalently,
210 billion US dollars (Ishiwatari, 2014). Carvalho et al. (2016) estimated that the disaster resulted
in a 0.47 percentage points decline in Japan’s real GDP in the year following the earthquake. Addi-
tionally, in figure A4, we can see the drop in Japan’s industrial production caused by the The Great
East Japan Earthquake. Between February and March 2011, the industrial production decreased
by more than 15 percentage points and only returned to pre-earthquake levels a few months later.
Naturally, the sizable drop in industrial output also caused a decrease in Japan’s exports. Focusing
on the US imports from Japan, figure A5 shows a sharp decrease in imports in the period imme-
diately after the earthquake.13 Even more interesting is the impact on the US production: in the
aftermath of the earthquake, the deviation from the trend for the US manufacturing and durable
goods’ production is clearly negative, as depicted in figure A6. Hence, it is possible to conclude
that this shock brought not only severe consequences to the Japanese economy, but also to its trad-
ing partners, illustrating the propagation of the shock (Todo et al. (2014), Carvalho et al. (2016),
Boehm et al. (2019)).
4 Production network diversification
In order to examine the adjustment process adopted by the firms in response to the supply-chain
disruption brought by The Great East Japan Earthquake, I explore the production network’s diver-
sification as the possible adjustment mechanism. As suggested by Pankratz and Schiller (2019),
when facing a disruption in their supply-chain, firms react by diversifying their supplier network
and replacing high-risk by lower-risk suppliers in terms of exposure to extreme climate circum-
13I decided to use the US imports from Japan in this illustrative example because most of the in-sample firms are
located in this country.
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stances. The benefits of suppliers’ diversification are also documented in Todo et al. (2014), since
firms can more easily substitute affected suppliers.
In particular, I test if firms with Japanese suppliers in March 2011 diversify their supply sources
after being negatively impacted by the earthquake due to the propagation of the shock. Note that
in this framework I use the existence of relationships with Japanese suppliers in March 2011 as
a proxy for a past supply-chain disruption. The lack of data about the exact location of firms’
suppliers in 2011 by prefecture prevents me from identifying precisely which firms had suppliers
in the most affected areas of Japan and, consequently, were indirectly affected by the earthquake
via downstream propagation of the shock. However, as it was previously shown, this earthquake
brought severe consequences for the Japanese economy as a whole, with a significant decrease in
the Japanese industrial production. This suggests that the consequences of the earthquake gen-
eralized over the country, and even firms not directly affected by the earthquake suffered with
this shock. One possible argument supporting this view is the interruption of many supply-chains
within the country, impairing non-affected firms’ production. Nonetheless, still in this regard, this
shortcoming is very likely to bias the estimates against finding any result.
To examine this hypothesis, I use a difference-in-differences setting, comparing the diversifica-
tion level of treatment and control groups over the 2008-2014 period. In figures A7a and A7b (in
the appendix), the evolution of the simple average outcome values for both groups of firms suggests
a higher degree of diversification for the treatment group in the years following the earthquake. As
a main specification, I regress each of the outcome variables on the Dummy Japanese Suppliers
2011 (the treatment variable), a dummy for each year between 2008 and 2014, and the interaction
between each year-dummy and the treatment variable. Furthermore, I also control for the Share
of Differentiated Inputs of the firm in each year. Finally, I include also firm, economy-year and
industry-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the economy-year level:
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Where i, t, c, j are, respectively, firm, year, country and industry indexes.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 2 and figures A8a and A8b (in the appendix) report the results, with
2008 as the base year. For both outcome variables, the parallel trend assumption is verified, as the
coefficients in the years before the shock are not statistically significant. As such, we disregard
the existence of a pre-shock trending behavior in the difference of the outcomes between both
groups. Moreover, the positive and statistically significant coefficients after the shock confirm the
higher degree of diversification for the firms with Japanese suppliers during the earthquake. In
fact, this group of firms increased more both the number of suppliers and supplier countries than
the control group. Additionally, I find that the difference grows over time, which suggests that the
diversification of supply sources might have been difficult (and costly) in the short term. In 2014,
a firm belonging to the treatment group (firms with Japanese suppliers in March 2011) had, on
average, 8.6 suppliers and 1.8 supplier countries more than a similar firm in the control group. As
alternative specifications, I use the Number of Japanese Suppliers 2011 as the treatment variable
(columns 3 and 4); or use the Post variable, instead of year dummies (columns 5 and 6).14 The
results are robust in all specifications.
In summary, after being negatively affected by the earthquake via downstream propagation of
the shock, firms increase not only the number of suppliers, but also the geographical dispersion
of their network of suppliers. By doing so, they enjoy the benefits of a diversified network of
suppliers, which are well-documented on the literature.
5 The COVID-19 global pandemic
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented consequences at a global scale,
forcing many governments to trade-off economic activity for restrictive health policies in order to
control the rise in infections. The disease, which was first identified in December 2019, in Wuhan,
China, quickly spread out, affecting virtually all economies worldwide. The unexpected nature of
this event and its implications for the business sector (which will be documented in this section)
14The Post variable takes the value of 1 for the years 2011-2014, and 0 otherwise.
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provide the ideal setting to address the immunity hypothesis of this paper.
5.1 Adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
In order to evaluate the direct adverse effects of the COVID-19 global pandemic on stock market
returns, the following fixed-effects model is estimated:
Returni,t = α0 +β1×COVID-19c,t +ηX ′i,2018×COVID-19c,t + γZ′c,2018×COVID-19c,t
+δi +δ j,t + εi,t (4)
Where i, t, c and j are, respectively, firm, week, country and industry indexes. X ′i,2018 and Z
′
i,2018
correspond to a set of firm and economy pre-pandemic traits, respectively. Besides firm fixed-
effects (δi), I also include industry-week fixed-effects (δ j,t), controlling for any time-invariant dif-
ferences across firms and time-varying attributes across industries.15 Standard errors are clustered
at the economy level. Initially, I exclude the interaction terms between COVID-19 and both firm
and economy traits. This allows me to quantify the economic magnitude of the COVID-19’s impact
on firms’ weekly stock returns.16 Column 1 of table 3 presents the results. If COVID-19 infec-
tions grow at the sample average value in an economy, the stock returns of firms operating in that
economy fall, on average, by around 0.44 percentage points more per week (0.59×0.744), which
is equivalent to 18.5% of the average value of weekly stock returns in the first quarter of 2020
(-2.37%). In column 2, I present the results of the full specification. The negative and significant
COVID-19 coefficient confirms the negative impact of an economy’s exposure to the pandemic on
the stock market performance of firms operating in that economy.
I also explore the impact of COVID-19 on several firm’s financial and performance indicators.
I use a fixed effects specification regressing each of four variables – Log (Net Sales), Debt/Assets,
Return on Assets and CAPEX/Assets – on two dummy variables, one for each quarter of 2020, and
15Industry-week fixed effects are build using the SIC 2-digit industry code.
16With the inclusion of the interaction terms with COVID-19, the partial effect of this variable on the weekly stock
returns depends on the specific firm and economy characteristics.
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a set of firm-level controls:17
Yi,q = α0 +β1×2020 Q1+β2×2020 Q2+ γX ′i,q +δi + εi,q (5)
Where i is the firm index, and q is the quarter index. In this model, the two dummy variables
capture the behavior of the outcome variables during the COVID-19 global pandemic, while con-
ditioning out time-invariant differences across firms (due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects (δi)),
and also controlling for other relevant time-varying firms’ attributes (X ′i,q). Standard errors are clus-
tered at the economy level. Table 4 reports the results. Regarding firms’ performance, Net Sales
decreased, on average, by 1.1% and 1.6% in the first and second quarter of 2020, respectively; the
Return on Assets was also negatively affected, decreasing on average by more than 0.85 percent-
age points per quarter in the first half of the year. Oppositely, the indebtedness level of the firms
increased during this period (column 3).18 In the last column of table 4, we observe that the ratio
of capital expenditures to total assets also declined in the first half of 2020, at an average rate of
approximately -0.32 percentage points per quarter. Finally, it is worthwhile to note that for all the
analyzed outcome variables, the negative impact of the pandemic is intensified from the first to the
second quarter of 2020, consistent with the long-lasting nature of the shock.
5.2 Downstream propagation of the shock along the supply-chain
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, besides disturbing companies’ business models and
forecasts for the future, also caused enormous disruptions in companies’ supply-chain networks.19
Many countries in which firms have their suppliers located ceased temporarily their economic ac-
tivity as a response to the increasing number of reported infections, forcing workers and firms to
stop producing. Figure A9 depicts the sharp decrease in the world’s merchandise trade volume
17The natural logarithm of Net Sales is used for interpretation purposes.
18This result can be interpreted as a mechanism adopted by the firms to smooth the negative impact generated by
the almost complete interruption of the economic activity in many countries. In fact, many governments resorted to




index in the first quarter of 2020. Taking this into consideration, this unexpected shock provides an
ideal setting to examine the existence of the downstream propagation effect of supply-chain shocks.
I focus exclusively on the stock market returns as the outcome variable, and isolate the impact of
the propagation effect by comparing firms with different levels of exposure to the pandemic in their
network of suppliers. Alternatively, previous literature on the topic documents this phenomenon
using other indicators, such as firms’ turnover and/or cost of goods sold. However, these studies
made use of a wider time period, allowing authors to assess the propagation effect on these vari-
ables with some delay (Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), Pankratz and Schiller (2019)). Since this is
not possible due to the lack of quarterly corporate data, I devote my attention to the propagation
effect on stock market returns, that are expected to respond immediately to shocks. Following Ding
et al. (2020), I measure risk exposure through the supply-chain using the variable Suppliers’ Expo-
sure and quantify its impact on the firms’ stock market returns for the 13 weeks between January
and March 2020. I aim to assess whether the impact of COVID-19 is more pronounced for firms
with a higher Suppliers’ Exposure, which suggests the propagation of the shock. Columns 3 and 4
of table 3 report the results. In column 4, I include economy-week fixed effects to control for all
time-varying economy factors, which omits COVID-19 and all the variables in Economy Traits *
COVID-19. The result is robust in both specifications. Firms with a network of suppliers located
in countries more exposed to the COVID-19 experience, on average, a stronger decline in their
stock price as a consequence of the pandemic. This result confirms the downstream propagation
of the shock. Regarding the magnitude of the coefficients, focusing on column 4, a one standard
deviation increase in a firm’s Suppliers’ Exposure intensifies the negative stock price reaction by
0.22 percentage points (0.79× 0.284). Furthermore, I explore the robustness of the propagation
effect over time by extending the time period to include the 35 weeks comprised since the begin-
ning of the year until the end of August 2020. Note that this sample-period includes the markets’
recovery phase after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, which started in the end of the first
quarter of 2020 (the sample average weekly stock return in April-August is 1.49%). The results are
reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 3. The coefficient in column 6 indicates that a one standard
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deviation increase in Suppliers’ Exposure raises the negative stock prices’ reaction, on average,
by 0.13 percentage points (0.57× 0.232). Although the impact is reduced in absolute terms, the
propagation effect seems to be robust over time: a higher Suppliers’ Exposure (which proxies for
a more severe disruption in firm’s supply-chain network) impacts negatively firms’ stock prices in
2020, even when considering the upturn phase of the market.
6 Empirical evidence of immunity to production network shocks
The last section of this paper tests if the firms affected by The Great East Japan Earthquake via
downstream propagation of the shock (and that diversified their production network), are able to
create immunity to future similar shocks. In order to test this hypothesis, I examine if the impact
of the supply-chain disruption caused by the COVID-19 global pandemic (given by the variable
Suppliers’ Exposure) is less severe for this group of firms. In particular, using the stock market
returns as the outcome variable, I compare the Suppliers’ Exposure effect for the control and treat-
ment groups. By interacting the Suppliers’ Exposure with each of the variables Dummy Japanese
Suppliers 2011 and Number of Japanese Suppliers 2011 and assessing its sign and significance,
it is possible to test the hypothesis that firms are able to create immunity to supply-chain shocks
after having been exposed to an identical shock in the past. I apply the same specifications as in
columns 3 and 4 of table 3 with these additional interaction terms. Columns 1-4 of table 5 reports
the results for the first quarter of 2020. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on
the interaction terms indicate that firms with Japanese suppliers in March 2011 are less affected
via supply-chain propagation of the COVID-19 shock than firms with no suppliers in that country
during the earthquake. This finding suggests that firms with a supply-chain disruption in the past
are able to adjust their production network (through diversification) to create a certain degree of
immunity to identical shocks. The coefficient in column 2 suggests that the adjustment may be so
important that these firms fully avoid the consequences of this shock. Among these companies,
a one standard deviation increase in Suppliers’ exposure increases the weekly stock return by 0.1
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percentage points [(−0.167+ 0.295)× 0.79]. As a robustness check, I extend the sample period
until the end of August 2020 (columns 5 and 6), and the result persists.
The exogenous nature of both shocks considered (the Great East Japan Earthquake and the
COVID-19 global pandemic) provides strong reasons in favor of the reliability of these findings.
Endogeneity would be a concern in the case of the omission of a variable that is simultaneously
correlated with the firms’ stock market returns in 2020 and the existence of Japanese suppliers in
March 2011. However, some arguments can be pointed out against this scenario. First, the unex-
pected nature of the earthquake did not allow firms to adjust their production network immediately
before the disaster, by substituting Japanese suppliers by others not affected by the catastrophe.
This means that the existence of relationships with Japanese suppliers was driven by other factors,
such as the firm´s industry, the geographical proximity to Japan, or the necessity of specific inputs
produced in this country, for instance. Potentially, some of these factors may also be correlated with
the firms’ stock market reaction to COVID-19. However, in this regard, I saturate the model with
fixed effects (firm, economy-week and industry-week fixed effects), as well as firm traits interacted
with COVID-19, which have the purpose of controlling for all these aspects, minimizing the pos-
sibility of an endogenous relations between these two variables. Finally, a fundamental argument
that must be emphasized is that firms with the past supply-chain disruption (which are aware of the
negative impact through the propagation effect), did not have enough time to adjust their production
network immediately before the COVID-19 pandemic, due to the unexpected nature of the event.
Taking these arguments into account, the result suggests that the adjustment process is undertaken
in anticipation of a new shock, so that firms benefit from this learning mechanism when facing a
new unexpected suppliers’ disruption event.
7 Conclusion
Firms’ vulnerability to production network shocks has been documented in the literature. In partic-
ular, the firm-level downstream propagation of shocks has been confirmed using several different
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natural experiments (hurricanes, blizzards, climate change, earthquakes...). As the growing pace of
supply-chains’ global integration constantly exposes firms to shocks of this nature, it is of major
importance to understand what may be the optimal reaction of firms after being negatively affected
by these idiosyncratic shocks.
This paper uses a ten-year time range to study whether firms are able to create immunity to
supply-chain shocks after having been exposed to a similar shock in the past. This time-period
comprehends two major events: The Great East Japan Earthquake and the COVID-19 global pan-
demic. I start by showing that companies with Japanese suppliers during the Japanese earthquake
diversified their production network in the years following the disaster. This evidence is sugges-
tive of an adjustment mechanism that may help firms mitigating the negative impact of a future
similar event. In order to show that this adjustment process is effective, I study how attenuated
the negative stock market reaction is to the downstream propagation effect of the COVID-19 pan-
demic for these firms. In this regard, I start by analyzing the direct impact of this crisis on firms’
stock market returns and on several firm fundamentals. I show that firms’ stock prices decreased
sharply in the first quarter of 2020 as a result of the propagation of the virus in the countries where
firms are located. Besides, the negative impact on firms’ fundamentals is exacerbated from the
first to the second quarter of 2020, consistent with the persistent nature of this shock. I then doc-
ument the downstream propagation of the COVID-19 shock, by showing that firms with a higher
disruption in their production network experience a higher decline in their stock prices. After
confirming the downstream propagation of the COVID-19 shock, I show that firms with a past dis-
ruption in their network of suppliers (proxied by firms with Japanese suppliers during The Great
East Japan Earthquake) build immunity to identical shocks after diversifying their supply-chain
network, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic, almost a decade later.
These findings provide important insights on how firms are able to adjust their network of
suppliers to hedge against supply-chain disruptions. In the growing “intricately linked web of
specialized production units” (Carvalho, 2014) in which economies operate, findings such as the
ones described in this paper assume an increasingly prominent role.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 No. Obs.
Panel A: Diversification 2008-2014
Total Number of Suppliers 14.94 25.75 1.00 3.00 7.00 15.00 35.00 6580
Number of Supplier Countries 4.01 4.32 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 9.00 6580
Share of Differentiated Inputs (%) 0.31 0.32 0 0 0.21 0.5 0.83 6580
Panel B: Replication and extended time period
Weekly Stock Return (First Quarter 2020) (%) -2.37 8.97 -14.10 -6.23 -1.02 2.10 6.11 45499
Weekly Stock Return (January-August 2020) (%) 0.20 8.52 -9.39 -3.75 0.05 3.93 9.30 122708
COVID-19 (First Quarter 2020) 0.59 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 1.84 676
COVID-19 (January-August 2020) 0.32 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.33 1.10 1820
Suppliers’ Exposure (First Quarter 2020) 0.72 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.23 1.90 45499
Suppliers’ Exposure (January-August 2020) 0.36 0.57 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.38 1.16 122708
Firm size 14.99 1.66 12.88 13.90 14.97 16.07 17.13 45499
Leverage 27.97 22.47 0.30 12.18 26.19 39.57 53.64 45499
Cash 15.96 18.61 1.61 4.19 9.46 19.47 39.88 45499
Return on Assets 4.35 16.11 -3.35 2.55 5.48 9.32 14.97 45499
Logarithm of GDP per capita 9.95 1.07 8.27 9.19 10.17 10.78 11.05 52
GDP growth 2.99 1.82 1.29 1.86 2.65 3.96 5.35 52
% Pop. above 65 12.99 6.36 4.31 7.12 14.02 18.90 20.10 52
Panel C: Quarterly Fundamentals
Log (Net Sales) 15.20 2.64 12.43 13.59 14.87 16.81 18.70 4143
Return on Assets 3.87 11.23 -7.90 0.74 4.69 9.18 15.15 4054
Debt/Assets 26.00 19.30 1.15 10.38 24.69 37.89 50.30 4095
CAPEX/Assets 4.90 5.45 0.45 1.38 3.13 6.22 11.16 3991
Log (Total Assets) 15.25 2.05 12.77 13.86 15.01 16.54 17.97 3455
Cash/Assets 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.25 3344
Working Capital/Assets 0.15 0.18 -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.25 0.39 3091
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.66 5.88 0.71 1.14 2.06 4.15 8.92 3317
Notes: In panel A, all variables are firm-year level. In panel B, COVID-19 is built using country-week data; economy
traits (Logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP growth and % pop. above 65) are built using country-level data; all the other
variables are firm-week level. In Panel C, all variables are firm-quarter level.
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Table 2. Production network’s diversification 2008-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Supplier Total Number of Number of Supplier Total Number of Number of Supplier Total Number of
Countries Suppliers Countries Suppliers Countries Suppliers
Post * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 1.094*** 5.017***
[0.208] [1.389]
D. 2009 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.125 -0.135
[0.295] [1.853]
D. 2010 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.425 -0.145
[0.269] [1.682]
D. 2011 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.947*** 1.095
[0.260] [1.518]
D. 2012 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 1.241*** 3.972***
[0.247] [1.450]
D. 2013 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 1.173*** 6.026***
[0.269] [1.544]
D. 2014 * Dummy Jap. Suppliers 2011 1.752*** 8.602***
[0.366] [2.546]
D. 2009 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.026 0.049
[0.022] [0.083]
D. 2010 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.117*** 0.540***
[0.021] [0.074]
D. 2011 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.068*** -0.032
[0.021] [0.156]
D. 2012 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.358*** 3.793***
[0.021] [0.084]
D. 2013 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.470*** 5.181***
[0.021] [0.110]
D. 2014 * Number of Jap. Suppliers 2011 0.501*** 5.980***
[0.029] [0.108]
Share of Diff. Inputs 0.438** 1.944*** 0.448** 1.972*** 0.445** 1.995***
[0.194] [0.632] [0.194] [0.585] [0.194] [0.640]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510
No. Firms 930 930 930 930 930 930
Adjusted R-Squared 0.787 0.855 0.789 0.871 0.786 0.854
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences specifications to study the production network diversification after The
Great East Japan Earthquake, in March 2011. The inclusion of firm, economy-year and industry-year fixed effects omits the treatment variable
(Dummy Japanese Suppliers 2011, Number of Japanese Suppliers 2011 and Post) and all the year-dummies. Robust standard errors clustered
at the economy -year level are reported in brackets. Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3. Direct impact and propagation effect of COVID-19 on firms’ stock returns
First Quarter 2020 January-August 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COVID-19 -0.744*** -4.088*** -3.605** -3.941**
[0.143] [1.415] [1.427] [1.642]
Suppliers’ Exposure -0.432*** -0.284*** -0.331*** -0.232***
[0.090] [0.061] [0.073] [0.060]
Economy Traits*COVID-19 No Yes Yes No Yes No
Firm Traits*COVID-19 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy-Week FE No No No Yes No Yes
No. Observations 45422 45422 45422 45409 122504 122469
No. Firms 3545 3545 3545 3544 3546 3545
Adjusted R-Squared 0.457 0.458 0.459 0.518 0.379 0.445
Notes: In all the regression displayed in this table, the dependent variable is the Weekly Stock Returns. Economy
traits include GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, % population above 65 years-old and a set of dummy
variables for the countries’ legal origin. Firm traits are composed by: Firm size, Leverage, Cash, Return on
Assets. Both economy and firm traits refer to the year of 2018. Columns 1-4 refer to the first quarter of 2020,
while columns 5 and 6 report the results for the extended time-period (until 28th August). Robust standard errors
clustered at the economy level are reported in brackets. Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01
Table 4. Response of firms’ financial and performance indicators to COVID-19
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (Net Sales) Return on Assets Debt/Assets CAPEX/Assets
2020 Q1 -0.011*** -0.758*** 0.509 -0.271***
[0.003] [0.274] [0.385] [0.086]
2020 Q2 -0.016*** -0.958*** 1.087*** -0.366***
[0.002] [0.217] [0.244] [0.100]
Log (Total Assets) 0.502*** 4.685 15.397*** -0.302
[0.134] [4.555] [5.469] [0.521]
Cash/Assets 0.009 -19.516 20.435*** -2.208
[0.164] [13.026] [3.345] [2.998]
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001 0.023 0.041 -0.037*
[0.001] [0.064] [0.058] [0.019]
Debt/Assets -0.003** -0.173** 0.009
[0.001] [0.071] [0.012]
Return on Assets 0.003*** -0.225*** 0.026***
[0.001] [0.054] [0.007]
Working capital/Assets 0.362* 11.958 -37.250*** -1.759**
[0.200] [9.753] [10.627] [0.776]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 3018 3008 3010 2984
No. Firms 544 539 540 535
Adjusted R-Squared 0.996 0.835 0.920 0.906
Notes: This table reports the behavior of several financial and performance indicators during the
first half of 2020 (pandemic period). Robust standard errors clustered at the economy level are
reported in brackets. Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5. Firms’ immunity to supply-chain disruptions
First quarter 2020 January-August 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COVID-19 -3.220** -3.204** -3.203*
[1.531] [1.533] [1.740]
Suppliers’ Exposure -0.264* -0.167* -0.263* -0.161* -0.187* -0.155*
[0.151] [0.095] [0.151] [0.092] [0.107] [0.082]
Suppliers’ Exposure * Dummy 0.173 0.295** 0.175** 0.319**
Japanese Suppliers 2011 [0.121] [0.143] [0.086] [0.136]
Suppliers’ Exposure * Number of 0.111** 0.131**
Japanese Suppliers 2011 [0.047] [0.061]
Economy Traits*COVID-19 Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm Traits*COVID-19 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy-Week FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. Observations 25292 25242 25292 25242 68216 68070
No. Firms 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969
Adjusted R-Squared 0.506 0.564 0.506 0.565 0.436 0.501
Notes: In all the regression displayed in this table, the dependent variable is the Weekly Stock Returns. Economy
traits include GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, % population above 65 years-old and a set of dummy
variables for the countries’ legal origin. Firm traits are composed by: Firm size, Leverage, Cash, Return on
Assets. Both economy and firm traits refer to the year of 2018. Columns 1-4 refer to the first quarter of 2020,
while columns 5 and 6 report the results for the extended time-period (until 28th August). Robust standard errors
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Number of Damaged Roads
Source: National Police Agency Japan
31














































Source: OECD (2020), Industrial production (indicator).
Notes: Industrial production refers to the output of industrial establishments
and covers sectors such as mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and steam
and air-conditioning.













































Source: US Census Bureau.
Notes: The series is logged and HP-filtered.
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US Manufacturing Goods Production US Durable Goods Production
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
Notes: The series is seasonally adjusted and HP-filtered.
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No Japanese Suppliers 2011 Japanese Suppliers 2011
(b) Number of Supplier Countries
The red line indicates The Great East Japan Earthquake.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(b) Outcome variable: Number of Supplier Countries
Figures A8a and A8b are built based on the results of the model reported in equation (5), which can be found in
columns 1 and 2 of table 2. They depict graphically the estimated coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the
interaction terms between the year-dummies and the variable Dummy Japan Suppliers 2011 (the treatment variable),
for each year between 2009 and 2014. The red dashed line indicates The Great East Japan Earthquake.
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Notes: The series is seasonally adjusted.
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Table A1. Number of firms in the sample, by country
Country No. of Firms Country No. of Firms
Argentina 23 Kuwait 5
Australia 199 Luxembourg 15
Austria 25 Malaysia 49
Bahrain 4 Mexico 33
Belgium 32 Morocco 1
Brazil 47 Netherlands 50
Canada 3 New Zealand 39
Chile 30 Norway 38
China 48 Oman 4
Colombia 8 Pakistan 2
Cyprus 2 Peru 15
Czech Republic 2 Philippines 21
Denmark 32 Poland 26
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6 Portugal 11
Finland 29 Russian Federation 32
France 122 Saudi Arabia 17
Germany 127 Singapore 40
Greece 14 South Africa 78
Hong Kong SAR, China 96 Spain 49
Hungary 3 Sweden 100
India 93 Switzerland 83
Indonesia 37 Thailand 32
Ireland 31 Turkey 38
Israel 15 United Arab Emirates 10
Italy 56 United Kingdom 35
Korea, Rep. 115 United States 1529
Total 3551
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Table A2. Variables’ description
Variable Description
Panel A: Diversification 2008-2014
Share of Diff. Inputs Share of each firm’s suppliers producing differentiated goods
Panel B: replication procedure
Weekly Stock Return Percentage variation in firm’s dividend-ajusted closing price computed using the last trading day of the week
COVID-19 Weekly growth rate of cumulative COVID-19 confirmed infections in a given economy
Suppliers’ Exposure Weighted average of COVID-19 among the supplier countries, where the weights are given by the pre-pandemic number of
suppliers from each country and COVID-19 varies weekly
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, in 2018
Leverage Percentage of total debt over total assets, in 2018
Cash Cash and equivalents divided by total assets, in 2018
Return on Assets Ratio of net income over total assets, in 2018
Log (GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita, in 2018
GDP growth The growth rate of GDP, in 2018
% pop. above 65 Percentage of population above 65 years-old, in 2018
Legal Origin Dummy variables for the legal origin of the country: English, French, German or Scandinavian origin
Panel C: corporate fundamentals
Log(Net Sales) Natural logarithm of firm’s net sales (or revenues), which correspond to the gross sales minus allowances, returns and discounts
Return on Assets The ratio of firm’s net income to total assets
Debt/Assets The ratio between firms’ total debt and total assets
Log(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of total assets
Cash/Assets Firm’s cash and short-term investments over total assets
Working Capital/Assets The difference between firm’s current assets and current liabilities, over total assets
Market-to-Book Ratio The ratio between firm’s market capitalization and its total book value
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